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To identify credit availability we analyze the extensive and intensive margins of lending with 
loan applications and all loans granted in Spain. We find that during the period analyzed both 
worse economic and tighter monetary conditions reduce loan granting, especially to firms or 
from banks with lower capital or liquidity ratios. Moreover, responding to applications for the 
same loan, weak banks are less likely to grant the loan. Our results suggest that firms cannot 
offset the resultant credit restriction by turning to other banks. Importantly the bank-lending 
channel is notably stronger when we account for unobserved time-varying firm heterogeneity 
in loan demand and quality. 
 
Keywords: non-financial and financial borrower balance-sheet channels, financial accelerator, 
firm borrowing capacity, credit supply, business cycle, monetary policy, credit channel, net 
worth, capital, liquidity, 2007-09 crisis. 
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To identify credit availability, we analyze a uniquely comprehensive micro-dataset that 
contains monthly information from 2002:M2 to 2008:M12 on firms’ loan applications to their non-
current banks. This dataset allows us to study the extension of credit to new clients (i.e., the extensive 
margin). We also analyze all business loans granted by all banks operating in Spain during the 
1988:Q2 to 2008:Q4 period and study the change in loan volume to old clients (i.e., the intensive 
margin). To identify the impact of both non-financial and financial borrower balance-sheet channels, 
we match the loans with both firm and bank identity and complete balance-sheet data, including 
precise capital- and liquidity-to-total-assets ratios. These variables capture net worth and balance-
sheet strength that determine the agency costs of borrowing for both firms and banks. The dataset is 
from Spain, a bank-dominated country with pronounced business cycles where the correlation 
between GDP growth and short-term interest rate changes is not strong, further enabling us to 
disentangle economic from monetary policy effects. 
On the extensive margin we find the following results: (1) Lower GDP growth or positive 
short-term interest rate changes reduce loan granting. (2) A decrease in firm capital reduces loan 
granting, but a decrease in bank capital or liquidity increases loan granting. (3) The negative effect of 
lower GDP growth or higher short-term interest rates on credit availability is stronger for both firms 
with low capital or liquidity and (independently) from banks with low capital or liquidity. Both the 
business cycle and monetary policy effects work strongly through the bank lending channel, while the 
level of firm capital plays a substantial role in channeling changes in GDP growth to changes in loan 
granting. Moreover, within the set of different applications for a loan from the same firm in the same 
month to different banks (i.e., keeping constant the quality of potential borrowers), we find that banks 
with low capital or liquidity grant fewer loans when GDP growth is lower or short-term interest rates 
are higher.  
To analyze credit substitution by firms, we match – at the firm-time level – the loan 
applications with all the granted loans. We find that – conditioning on a firm’s need for funds – weak 
firms, and also average firms associated with banks with weaker capital or liquidity, have a higher 
probability of obtaining zero granted loans when economic and monetary conditions are tighter. 
Hence, the results suggest that loan supply restrictions are binding and cannot be fully offset by firms 
turning to other (stronger) banks. 
Finally, we analyze the intensive margin employing all the granted business loans in Spain 
during the last 20 years. This is important for several reasons. The intensive margin may be 
economically more significant than the extensive one, we can cover two business cycles, and using all 
granted loans may be better to analyze credit substitution by firms across different banks. To account 
for unobserved time-varying firm loan demand and quality shocks, we saturate the econometric model 
with firm-quarter fixed effects as in Khwaja and Mian (2008). Not only do we find evidence for the 
existence of a bank lending channel, we also show that the bank-lending channel is stronger if we 
account for unobserved time-varying firm heterogeneity in loan demand and quality. These findings 
suggest that an empirical analysis of the bank lending channel done at the bank level, as Kashyap and 
Stein (2000), significantly underestimate the strength of the bank lending channel.  
The datasets and empirical setting allow us to better disentangle loan demand and supply and 
firm and bank balance-sheet channels, thus allowing us to draw policy conclusions that are 
immediately relevant for the current financial crisis. In particular, our estimates have a direct bearing 
on the effects of the developing capital and credit supply and on the usefulness of monetary policy, 
recapitalizations and liquidity injections in banks and firms to ameliorate credit supply conditions, 
thus suggesting that exit strategies need to be carefully assessed. 6
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I.  Introduction 
The dramatic events unfolding in the global economy during the last few years have 
again highlighted the key role played by financial frictions for business cycle 
fluctuations. Observers and policy makers alike recurrently worry about weakening 
firm and bank balance sheets that may worsen the contractive impact of adverse 
economic and tight monetary conditions on the supply of credit. Many 
recapitalizations and liquidity injections later, and after an exceptionally expansionary 
monetary policy period, it is still unclear whether the unprecedented policies pursued 
by all major central banks and governments around the world have been adequate to 
soften the credit crunch.
1 
But do adverse economic conditions and contractive monetary policy reduce both 
firm borrowing capacity and bank loan supply? And does the reduction in credit 
availability depend equally on firm versus bank balance-sheet strength (Bernanke and 
Blinder (1988), Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Bernanke et al. (1996))?
2 That is, do 
agency costs of borrowing between firms and banks and between banks and their 
financiers – proxied by both firm and bank capital- and liquidity-to-total-assets ratios 
as in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and Diamond and Rajan (2009) for example – 
                                                 
1 Bernanke and Lown (1991) define a credit crunch as “a significant leftward shift in the supply curve 
for loans, holding constant both the safe real interest rate and the quality of potential borrowers.” They 
further relate a credit crunch to a capital crunch and provide empirical evidence on the US economic 
crisis in the early 1990s. (also Peek and Rosengren (1995)). Chari et al. (2008), Cohen-Cole et al. 
(2008), Huang (2009), Ivashina and Scharfstein (2009), and Puri et al. (2009), among others, provide 
related evidence from the recent crisis. 
2 See also Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Bernanke (1983), Bernanke and Gertler (1987), Kiyotaki and 
Moore (1997), Stein (1998), Diamond and Rajan (2006), Matsuyama (2007), among others. Bernanke 
(2007) suggests that the bank lending channel is the (borrower) balance-sheet channel of Bernanke, 
Gertler and Gilchrist (1996) and Bernanke et al. (1999) for banks that obtain funds from depositors, 
other debt-holders and equity holders. Hence, not only the agency problems between banks and their 
borrowers (firms and households) but also the agency problems between banks and their providers of 
funds matter. Gertler and Kiyotaki (2009) formalize the bank balance-sheet channel modeling financial 
intermediation as in Gertler and Karadi (2009) but include liquidity risk as in Kiyotaki and Moore 
(2008). 7
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make lending significantly more problematic during economic downturns or monetary 
contraction periods? 
To convincingly answer these questions three major identification challenges need to 
be addressed. First, “borrowers may be both balance-sheet constrained and bank-
dependent” (Gertler and Gilchrist (1994)), and weak firms with low-quality balance 
sheets may therefore borrow more from weak banks.
3 Hence, any analysis based only 
on firm (or bank) level data suffers from an omitted-variables problem. Moreover, 
firm and bank balance-sheet channels may be directly interrelated as tight monetary 
conditions may decrease borrower net worth, which may have a negative impact on 
bank net worth. Estimating both channels simultaneously is therefore essential, and 
this requires an analysis at the individual loan level of contract information coupled 
with both firm and bank characteristics. 
Second, the supply of credit needs to be disentangled from its demand (see Bernanke 
and Gertler (1995) and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996)). Low economic 
growth and tight monetary conditions may lower both loan demand and supply. 
Demand may fall because the expectations for investment are depressed and the cost 
of financing is high. Supply may contract because  as already indicated  the agency 
costs of borrowing may increase. 
Third, if country business cycle conditions completely determine short-term interest 
rate changes, which may be the case in many countries (e.g., through a Taylor (1993)-
rule), separating the effects of monetary conditions from those of economic activity is 
problematic. 
                                                 
3 In theory firm and bank balance-sheet strengths could be correlated: the higher the agency problems 
between firms and banks due to the firms’ moral hazard, the more fragile the banks will be (Diamond 
and Rajan (2001)). Peek and Rosengren (2005) and Caballero et al. (2008) document that, during the 
Japanese financial crisis, banks with capital ratios closer to the minimum binding levels lent more to 
zombie firms. Hence, the strength of the lending banks’ balance-sheets was positively correlated with 
those of the borrowing firms. 8
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Our main contribution to the literature consists in taking additional but crucial steps 
in addressing all three identification challenges at once. In particular, we analyze the 
effects of economic activity and monetary conditions on the availability of credit and 
account simultaneously for the strength of the firm and bank balance sheets. We use 
individual loan records on all granted business loans, including loan application 
records, from Spain, a country where most firms are bank dependent and where the 
correlation between GDP growth and short-term interest rate changes is not strong, 
further enabling us to disentangle economic from monetary policy effects.. 
The empirical micro literature, which we review later, has been constrained by the 
unavailability of comprehensive loan-level data and, thus, has mainly addressed these 
challenges at the firm or bank level using credit aggregates (e.g., Gertler and Gilchrist 
(1994) for firms and Kashyap and Stein (2000) for banks). In contrast we tackle these 
fundamental research questions at the loan level and rely on three unique features of 
the Credit Register of the Banco de España (CIR) to attain identification. First, the 
CIR database contains detailed monthly information on all, new and outstanding, 
loans (over 6,000 Euros) to non-financial firms granted by all credit institutions 
operating in Spain since 1984. The more than fifty million granted loans on record 
avert any concerns about unobserved changes in bank lending, which is important 
since economic or monetary conditions may influence bank lending to smaller firms 
for example (Lang and Nakamura (1995), Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996)). 
We analyze this dataset to study the changes in the volume of lending to all clients, 
including those currently borrowing from the bank (i.e., the intensive margin). 
Loan applications are the CIR’s second unique feature. During the last seven years 
the CIR recorded all information requests lodged by banks. In total more than 
2,350,000 requests were filed. Because banks monthly receive information on all 9
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outstanding loans and defaults of their current borrowers, they will only file 
information requests following loan applications from firms that are currently not 
borrowing from them, in particular we observe each loan that is actually granted by a 
bank with the set of corresponding loan applications (i.e., the extensive margin). The 
loans granted to noncurrent borrowers surely do not involve simply the renewal or 
even evergreening of outstanding loans. 
Third, the CIR uniquely contains loan conditions and tracks key firm and bank 
characteristics, including identity. Therefore, both the granted loan and loan 
application datasets can be augmented with complete accounting information, 
including accurate measures of capital and liquidity. These are recorded monthly for 
banks since 1984 and yearly for firms since 1992. This feature of the CIR allows us to 
simultaneously control for and exploit firm and bank identity and accounting 
information, and relate the approval and granting of loans with firm and bank balance-
sheet strength. 
The three unique features of the CIR allow us to improve identification. First, to 
disentangle firm and bank balance-sheet channels we study micro-data at the 
individual loan level matched with both complete firm and bank information (a course 
of action strongly advocated by Kashyap et al. (1996)). Not only do we control for 
both firm and bank variables, but also exploit theoretically motivated interactions 
between economic and monetary conditions on the one hand and firm and bank 
balance-sheet strength variables on the other to identify supply (Bernanke, Gertler and 
Gilchrist (1996), Kashyap and Stein (2000)). The definition of the capital- and 
liquidity-to-total-assets ratios we employ closely follows the theoretical literature that 
attributes a prominent role to net worth in reducing the agency costs of borrowing, 10
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which sharpens the interpretation of the coefficients on their interactions with 
economic and monetary conditions.
4 
Second, to separate bank loan supply from demand we study the extensive margin 
with loan applications and analyze whether economic and monetary conditions 
interacted with firm and bank balance-sheet strength affects the probability a loan is 
granted. Tackling the first and second identification challenges jointly, we further 
focus on the set of multiple loan applications that are made in one month by the same 
borrower to multiple banks of varying balance-sheet strengths (by including in the 
specifications firm-month or alternatively loan fixed effects). Within such a set of 
loan applications, for which the (observed and unobserved) quality of potential 
borrowers is constant as in the credit crunch definition by Bernanke and Lown (1991), 
we study how bank capital and liquidity affect the granting of loans. In addition, we 
analyze whether firms that get rejected in their initial loan application can undo the 
resultant reduction in credit availability by successfully applying to other banks. 
To identify loan supply when analyzing the intensive margin with all granted loans, 
we account for unobserved time-varying firm heterogeneity in loan quality and 
demand, by saturating the specification with firm-quarter fixed effects (as in Khwaja 
and Mian (2008)). We identify the causal impact of the bank lending channel by 
showing that for the same firm borrowing from at least two different banks in the 
same quarter the amount borrowed from the weaker bank declines more when 
monetary and economic conditions are tighter. 
                                                 
4 The agency problem in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2009) for example depends on the level of capital over 
the total assets “as a borrower’s percentage stake in the outcome of an investment project increases, his 
or her incentive to deviate from the interests of lenders’ declines.” See also Holmstrom and Tirole 
(1997) and Holmstrom and Tirole (1998). By definition capital and liquidity ratios are liability- and 
asset-based respectively and are relevant for both firms and banks, in contrast to asset tangibility or 
wholesale to retail deposit ratios for example that are only relevant for either firms or banks, 
respectively. 11
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Third, to distinguish between the impact of real activity and monetary conditions, we 
rely on the observation that – since mid 1988 – the correlation between GDP growth 
and short-term interest rate changes has not been strong, further enabling us to 
disentangle economic from monetary policy effects. The monetary policy was 
basically coming first by the Bundesbank and then by the European Central Bank. 
Their mandates focused on price stability and the correlation of GDP growth (or 
Taylor-rule implied rates) between Germany (Euro Area) and Spain has never been 
strong. Moreover, the current recession that is taking place was partially triggered 
and/or worsened by financial and economic conditions abroad. The 1993 recession 
similarly came after a recession in the US and a significantly raise of monetary policy 
rates by the Bundesbank (which the Banco de España followed). 
In sum, our study is the first in the financial accelerator literature  as far as we are 
aware  to analyze loan applications (also matched with firm and bank information), 
to account for unobserved time-varying firm loan demand and quality, and to study a 
country with fairly exogenous monetary policy. Our study yields the following robust 
results. On the extensive margin using loan applications we find that: (1) lower GDP 
growth or positive short-term interest rate changes reduce the probability that a loan is 
granted. (2) A decrease in firm capital reduces loan granting, firm liquidity does not 
matter, while a decrease in bank capital or liquidity has a positive effect on loan 
granting. (3) The negative effect of lower GDP growth or higher short-term interest 
rate on loan granting is statistically stronger both for firms with low capital or 
liquidity and (independently) from banks with low capital or liquidity. 
All findings are robust to the inclusion of firm, bank and month fixed effects in 
different combinations. Within all the loan applications received by a bank in a month 
we find that firms with low capital or liquidity are less likely to get a loan when GDP 12
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growth is lower or short-term interest rate changes are higher. Moreover, within the 
set of applications made in the same month by the same firm to different banks, and 
within the set of different applications made for the same granted loan, we find that 
banks with low capital or liquidity grant fewer loans when GDP growth is lower or 
short-term interest rate changes are higher. The first evidence  we think  that 
clearly identifies that, under tighter economic or monetary conditions, bank capital 
and/or liquidity have a significant impact on credit supply (Bernanke and Lown 
(1991)). 
However, loan applications have been available only during the last seven years and 
may not be fully representative in terms of the actual borrowing that takes place if 
firms end up borrowing from their current banks if their applications elsewhere (i.e., 
the ones we observe) fail. Three sets of exercises thoroughly address these potential 
limitations of the loan application dataset. First, we study only firms that are 
noncurrent for all banks, i.e., firms that do not have any bank loan outstanding at the 
time of the loan application. We find similar results. Second, we match the loan 
application dataset to the dataset of all loans granted in Spain and study only those 
firms that applied for loans and, hence, are in need of financing. We find that weaker 
firms and firms associated with weaker banks face a higher probability of obtaining 
no bank loans at all when economic and monetary conditions are tighter. The loan 
supply restriction is therefore binding and firms cannot offset it by turning to other 
banks where the acceptance probability may be lower in any case or by leaning more 
on their current banks. 
Finally, we analyze the impact of monetary and economic conditions on the intensive 
margin by employing all granted business loans in Spain during the 1988:Q2-2008:Q4 
period. We find that the bank lending channel is both operative and potent. The 13
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channel is even stronger if we include firm-quarter fixed effects that account for 
unobserved time-varying firm loan demand and quality. This last finding suggests that 
an empirical analysis done at the bank level (as in Kashyap and Stein (2000)) 
significantly underestimates the relevancy of the bank lending channel, explaining 
why in contrast to most existing literature (Romer and Romer (1990), Ramey (1993), 
Bernanke and Gertler (1995), and Angeloni et al. (2003) for example) our analysis 
documents its existence and potency. 
In sum, our results suggest that: (1) the strength of firm and bank balance-sheets 
plays an economically relevant role in channeling changes in GDP and short-term 
interest rates to credit availability; and (2) analyzing the bank lending channel at the 
bank level may crucially underestimate its importance because firm loan demand and 
quality are correlated with bank balance-sheet strength. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II provides a brief review of the 
literature highlighting the testable hypotheses from theory and the identification 
challenges from the empirical studies. Section III presents the database and discusses 
the empirical strategy. Section IV explains the variables in detail, and presents and 
discusses the results. Section V concludes and discusses the policy implications. 
II. Theory, Testable Hypotheses, and Empirical Work 
We first very briefly review the literature highlighting both the testable hypotheses 
emanating from theory and the identification challenges faced by the empirical studies 
(for recent literature reviews see Bernanke (2007) and Boivin et al. (2009)). In 
standard models of lending with asymmetric information and/or incomplete 
contracting, the external finance premium depends inversely on the borrowers' net 
worth (see Freixas and Rochet (2008) for a review). When borrowers have little 
wealth to contribute to the financing of their projects, the potential divergence of 14
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interests between the borrower and the suppliers of external funds is larger, increasing 
agency costs. In equilibrium, lenders must be compensated. As borrower net worth is 
pro-cyclical (because profits and asset prices are pro-cyclical), the external finance 
premium is countercyclical, amplifying the changes in credit availability and thus in 
investment, spending, and production (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), 
Matsuyama (2007)). In Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) the agency problems depend on 
the capital-to-total-assets ratio, in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) net worth is 
also associated with the liquidity of the assets. 
Since banks not only face agency problems with their borrowers, but banks 
themselves are also borrowing funds from their depositors and other financiers, bank 
net worth may determine their own agency costs of borrowing (Bernanke (2007), 
Gertler and Kiyotaki (2009)). The capital-to-total-assets ratio of the bank determines 
its own stake and incentive to exert effort to monitor in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). 
Hence, higher bank capital implies easier access to finance for banks thus allowing 
more lending to firms for example. On the other hand, higher bank capital 
mechanically implies lower (short-term) debt for banks, softening their hard-budget 
constraint and decreasing their ability to provide liquidity and hence credit (Diamond 
and Rajan (2000)).
5 
                                                 
5 In addition, higher banks’ net worth or charter value also makes a “gambling for resurrection” 
strategy possibly involving excessive lending to riskier clients less attractive (Kane (1989), Hellman et 
al. (2000)). However, banks with less capital and more illiquid assets have especially during bad times 
an incentive to increase their capital and liquidity, and restrict lending due to their fear of liquidity 
shocks, their own needs for future liquidity, and/or the potential use of liquidity for buying distressed 
assets in the market (Diamond and Rajan (2009)). During bad times lower bank capital constrains 
lending because: (1) Wholesale depositors and bank investors demand higher levels of capital as a 
buffer for losses and to reduce bank moral hazard problems (see Iyer and Peydró (2009) for evidence), 
(2) bank incentives to monitor and screen new borrowers are lower (Holmstrom and Tirole (1997)), 
and (3) capital levels get closer to the regulatory limits. During normal times bank equity is 
considerably more expensive than bank short-term debt. During bad times the situation worsens, hence 
it may not be optimal or feasible for current bank shareholders to raise bank equity then. Banks with 
low levels of liquid assets similarly may try to increase their holdings of liquid assets during bad times, 
thus reducing new lending. 15
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Finally, higher levels of short-term interest rates reduce borrowers’ net worth in turn 
worsening the agency problems between lenders and their borrowers (Bernanke and 
Gertler (1995)), both between firms and their banks, and also between banks and their 
financiers (Bernanke (2007)).
6 
In sum, the testable hypotheses present in the aforementioned theory are: 
(H1) Loan supply is reduced by lower GDP growth and/or higher short-term interest 
rates.
7 
(H2) Lower firm capital reduces firm borrowing capacity. Lower bank capital has an 
ambiguous effect on loan supply. 
(H3) The negative impact of lower GDP growth and/or higher short-term interest 
rates on loan supply is stronger for firms with low capital or liquidity, and from banks 
with low capital or liquidity. 
Due to the unavailability of comprehensive loan-level data, a large empirical 
literature mostly has investigated the firm and bank-balance sheet channels 
independently, with the analysis done at either the firm or the bank level. Moreover, 
the literature has tried to control for loan demand through some observed firm 
characteristics like industry or by interactions between economic/monetary conditions 
and firm/bank characteristics.
8 However, as far as we are aware, and probably due to 
                                                 
6 Short-term interest rates may not only affect banks’ incentives for lending but also for risk-taking 
(Jiménez et al. (2008), Ioannidou et al. (2009), Adrian and Shin (2010)). Angeloni and Faia (2009) 
integrate Diamond and Rajan (2000)-type banks that are exposed to runs into a standard DSGE model. 
They show that monetary contractions may reduce bank leverage and risk. 
7 The testable implications emanating from a financial accelerator model are especially relevant during 
economic recessions or periods with a tightened monetary policy stance, but credit availability can also 
be linearly dependent on economic and monetary conditions. We test the latter implication without loss 
of generality. 
8 Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) and Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) for example find that, following the 
dates of monetary contractions identified in Romer and Romer (1989)), the ratio of bank loans to small 
versus large manufacturing firms falls. Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) show that, even after controlling 
for differences in sales between these firms, the differences in the behavior of small and large firm debt 
remain. See also Lang and Nakamura (1995) and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996). Bernanke and 
Blinder (1992) focus on the bank side. They find that a monetary contraction is followed by a 16
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unavailability of data, no paper has so far employed comprehensive loan level data, 
has investigated simultaneously the effects of economic and monetary conditions 
working through both firm and bank-balance sheet channels, has analyzed loan 
applications, and has accounted for unobserved time-varying firm loan demand and 
quality by including firm-time fixed effects. In particular the usage of loan 
applications and firm-time fixed effects are crucial when identifying loan supply from 
demand. 
III. Data and Empirical Strategy 
In the previous two Sections we have discussed the three main identification 
challenges when analyzing whether – and through which channels – economic and 
monetary conditions affect loan supply. In this Section we discuss the data we employ 
in our empirical work to tackle these identification challenges. 
A. Loan Applications 
All banks in Spain automatically receive monthly updated information on the total 
current credit exposures and (possible) loan defaults  vis-à-vis all other banks in 
Spain  of their own current borrowers. This information is extracted from the Credit 
Register of the Banco de España (CIR). Any bank can also request this information 
on potential borrowers, which are defined as “any firm that seriously approaches the 
bank to obtain credit.” The monetary cost of requesting this information is zero. But a 
                                                                                                                                            
significant decline in aggregate bank lending. To better control for loan demand, Kashyap and Stein 
(2000) analyze whether there are also important cross-sectional differences in the way that banks 
respond to monetary policy shocks. They find that, following a monetary contraction, small banks with 
liquid balance sheets cut their lending less than other small banks. See also Kishan and Opiela (2000), 
Jayaratne and Morgan (2000), Ashcraft (2006) and Black et al. (2009), among others. Khwaja and 
Mian (2008) examine the drop in lending by different banks to similar firms following shocks to banks’ 
liquidity that are induced by unanticipated nuclear tests in Pakistan. Banks pass their liquidity shortages 
to firms, but firms with strong business or political ties can turn to alternative sources in the credit 
market (see also Gan (2007)). 
 17
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Law stipulates that a bank cannot ask for the information without consent by the 
potential borrower, indicating a seriousness of intent regarding the “financial 
relationship between bank and firm.” 
We observe all requests for information on potential borrowers between 2002:M02 
and 2008:M12 (before 2002 the requests were not stored). Though the requests can be 
made at any time, they are collated monthly and uniquely link borrowers with banks. 
Requests for information on firms that are currently borrowing from the requesting 
bank would yield information that is already known to this bank. Consequently, 
requesting information from the CIR is especially useful if the firm has never before 
received a loan from the bank (that is requesting the information) or when the 
relationship between the firm and the bank ended before. In this way, the information 
requests focus our analysis on a key category of borrowers that do not simply renew 
or even evergreen existing loans at their current bank, but that seek new loans from 
another bank (i.e., the extensive margin).
9 
Between 2002:M02 to 2008:M12 we observe more than 2,350,000 bank requests for 
information. For each request we also observe whether the loan is accepted and 
granted, or not, by matching the loan application database with the CIR database, 
which contains the stock of all loans granted. Therefore, if multiple banks request 
                                                 
9 Since we cannot observe firm loan applications to their current banks, we later on also study only 
firms that do not have any bank loan outstanding at the time of the loan application. These firms are 
noncurrent for all banks and hence we have the loan applications from all the banks. Notice that 
approximately one fifth of the loans to borrowers entirely new to the bank are granted without any 
information request on record during the last sample quarter. This statistic shows that while the 
monetary cost of requesting the information is zero, non-pecuniary costs may not be. For example, an 
information request may slight borrowers (whose consent is required), involves waiting, uses 
management time processing the information, and/or may result in a loss of reputation vis-à-vis the 
Banco de España if prospects turn idle. Especially for the very good or connected borrowers that don’t 
take a “check-and-wait” for an answer or during economic expansions when capacity constraints at the 
bank become binding, these non- pecuniary costs may be relevant. Banks may further not request 
information about the largest firms for example because these firms deal with many banks, are well-
known, and/or do not seek regular loans. For all these reasons and for completeness we also study all 
the actual loans granted to all firms when analyzing the intensive margin. 18
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information on a particular borrower in the same month, we can infer the bank that 
granted the loan and the banks that did not. In case a bank requests information but 
does not grant the loan, either the bank denied the firm credit or the firm perceived the 
offered conditions by the bank to be less attractive than those of the loan it eventually 
took. Hence, we can link loan granting for the same firm within a month to bank 
balance-sheet strength. 
We match the application dataset with firm and bank datasets, so that we have 
balance-sheet information for each firm that applies for a loan and for each bank that 
receives a loan application and/or grants a loan. The firms’ dataset is available from 
the Spanish Mercantile Register at a yearly frequency starting in 1992. The banks’ 
dataset, at a monthly frequency starting in 1984, is owned by the Banco de España in 
its role as banking supervisor. We can match more than 800,000 loan applications. As 
we have the loan applications plus firm and bank characteristics, in particular their 
capital and liquidity ratios as measures of their balance sheet strength, we are able to 
better disentangle the demand from the supply of loans. Through the loan 
applications, loan demand for each bank is in a sense given and observed, and each 
bank has to decide only on the granting of each loan  “its loan supply”  knowing 
the firm characteristics. To absorb variation in loan demand and supply quality over 
the business and monetary policy cycles, we include a wide array of firm and bank 
characteristics, including their identity (fixed effect), capital, liquidity, assets, age, and 
profitability for example. As far as we are aware, ours is the first paper that analyzes 
the impact of business cycle and monetary conditions on the probability of loans 
being granted following applications. 
Then, as in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996) and Kashyap and Stein (2000), we 
exploit the cross-sectional implications of the sensitivity of credit availability to 19
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economic and monetary conditions according to the strength of the firm and bank 
balance sheets. Following the theoretical literature we focus on net worth and 
liquidity. Because of lack of data, most other studies had to rely on size or debt as a 
proxy for net worth. Following Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) we define net worth  
both for firms and for banks  as the capital-to-total-assets ratio.
10 Following 
Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2009) we also feature a 
liquidity measure for both firms and banks. The 100,000 firms and 200 banks active 
in the loan application dataset provide ample cross-sectional variation in both 
measures. 
We control for time-invariant differences in the quality of applicants by including 
firm fixed effects and, in some regressions, we also control for differences across 
banks and time periods by including bank and month fixed effects. To identify loan 
supply contractions (Bernanke and Lown (1991)), we analyze the success of the loan 
applications made in the same month by the same firm to multiple banks that differ in 
capital and liquidity and within all loan applications received for the same loan by 
multiple banks. We also analyze variation within all loan applications received in the 
same month by the same bank to assess how firm capital and liquidity affect bank 
loan granting following changes in economic and monetary conditions. 
Finally, since firms may shift their applications between banks of different balance 
sheet strengths possibly neutralizing the supply effect measured with loan 
applications, we match the loan application dataset to the dataset that contains all 
loans granted in Spain (see below) and  at the firm level  study only those firms 
that applied for loans and hence are in need of financing. We then analyze whether 
                                                 
10 Off-balance sheet volumes are very small in Spain. Hence, total bank assets cover most of the banks’ 
businesses. Banks did not develop conduits or Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs) because the 
prevailing accounting rules made banks consolidate these items and set aside sufficient capital. 20
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weaker firms face different likelihood of obtaining bank loans at all when economic 
and monetary conditions are tighter. 
B. All Loans Granted 
We also analyze the records on all granted business loans for the extended 1988:Q2 
to 2008:Q4 period because with the loan application dataset we can only analyze the 
extensive margin, i.e., the information requests follow loan applications by firms that 
are currently not borrowing from the bank. Loan applications are also only recorded 
since 2002. 
For these purposes, we employ the information in the CIR which contains 
confidential and very detailed information at the loan level on virtually all 
commercial and industrial (C&I) loans granted to all non-financial publicly limited 
and limited liability companies (that account for around 95% of all firms) by all 
commercial banks, savings banks and credit cooperatives (that account for more than 
95% of the entire Spanish financial system) operating in Spain. The CIR is almost 
comprehensive, as the reporting threshold for a loan is only 6,000 Euros. Given that 
we consider only C&I loans, this threshold is very low which alleviates any concerns 
about unobserved changes in bank credit to small and medium sized enterprises 
(which may be more influenced by changes in business cycle and monetary policy 
under the credit channel theory for example).
11 As before, we match CIR data 
compiled at a quarterly frequency with complete bank balance-sheet variables and 
                                                 
11 See e.g. Gertler and Gilchrist (1993), Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and 
Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996). The Credit Register contains more than 2,400,000 loans in the 
last month of 2008. The commercial and financial loans we study in this paper represent 82.6% of all 
loans that are granted (excluding leasing, factoring and other specialized loans). Incomplete coverage 
of the widely used U.S. (National) Survey of Small Business Finances or Loan Pricing Corporation 
datasets for example may complicate any analysis of bank credit provision. 21
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exploit relevant interactions between business cycle conditions and bank balance-
sheet strength.
12 
To account for unobserved time-varying firm loan demand and quality shocks we 
saturate the specification with firm-year:quarter (which we shorthand as firm-quarter) 
fixed effects as in Khwaja and Mian (2008). As explained in the Introduction, our 
identification therefore entirely comes from firms that at least once in their history 
borrow from two different banks during the same quarter. Not only do we want to test 
the existence of the bank lending channel, but also whether it is correlated with firm 
demand and balance-sheet channels. This is a key test to shed light on whether it is 
possible to investigate the credit channels at the firm or bank level (as in Gertler and 
Gilchrist (1994) and Kashyap and Stein (2000)), or if it is imperative to test them at 
the loan level. 
C. Economic and Monetary Conditions 
Separating the effects of economic activity from monetary conditions on bank 
lending is generally difficult as short-term interest rate changes are determined by the 
business cycle (as in a Taylor-rule). We start from the observation that – since mid 
1988 – the correlation between GDP growth and short-term interest rate changes has 
not been strong in Spain, which enables to disentangle economic from monetary 
policy effects (see Banco de España (1997) and Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró and Saurina 
(2008)). Spain formally joined the European Monetary Mechanism in 1989, 
informally in mid 1988, after joining the European Union in 1986. Monetary 
                                                 
12 Before 1992 we can match each loan to selected firm characteristics, i.e., identity, industry, location, 
the level of credit and default. For loans to households, in all time periods, a very limited set of 
characteristics is available. Given the focus of our paper, we therefore study only the loans that were 
granted to firms. 22
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conditions consequently became basically set first through the fixed exchange rate 
policy with the Deutsche Mark and as of January 1, 1999, within the Eurosystem. 
Moreover, GDP growth in Germany and Spain were only weakly synchronized 
during the last twenty years. For example, during the period 2002-2005 short-term 
interest rates were low given the slow economic growth in Germany, Italy and France 
(the three larger Euro area economies). But potentially these rates were less fitting 
Spain’s much higher economic growth rates. Consequently, there is a significant 
exogenous variation in short-term interest rates allowing us to disentangle its effects 
from those of local Spanish economic activity.
13 
The current recession in Spain, in addition, was partly initiated by the financial crisis 
abroad, providing a modicum of exogeneity to its start. The European Central Bank 
also did not decrease its policy rates as much as the Federal Reserve, partly because 
its main mandate is to ensure price stability. However, the economic contraction in 
Spain has been severe. In less than two years time Spain’s unemployment rate for 
example more than doubled, from eight to almost twenty percent (2007:Q2 to 
2009:Q3). 
As explained above, given the previous paragraphs and that our purpose in this paper 
is to control better for loan demand and analyze the credit channel, we use simple 
measures of economic and monetary conditions: GDP growth and short-term interest 
rate changes. In addition, to complete our specifications we include inflation as an 
important economic determinant of short-term interest rates in all specifications. 
Robustness exercises feature month, bank-month or firm-month fixed effects to 
control for other macroeconomic factors. 
                                                 
13 Since 1999, monetary policy is set for the euro area as a whole, with Spain being a part of the euro 
area, but entering only with its relative weight (less than 15% of the euro area output). 23
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IV. Dependent Variable, Independent Variables and Results 
We first analyze in detail the extensive margin with the set of business loan 
applications introducing all loan, firm, bank and macro variables, and then analyze the 
intensive margin with the dataset on all granted business loans. 
A. The Extensive Margin with Loan Applications 
1.  Main Dependent Variable: LOAN APPLICATION IS 
GRANTED 
Table 1 defines the dependent and independent variables employed in the first set of 
empirical specifications (reported in Tables 2 to 3) as well as their descriptive 
statistics. The dependent variable we feature first is LOAN APPLICATION IS 
GRANTED (we recurrently shorthand this as “loan granting”), which equals one if 
the loan application by firm i at time t is approved by bank b and the loan is granted in 
month t to t+3, and equals zero otherwise (results are unaffected if the loan is granted 
in t to t+1 or in t to t+2). 
We also match each loan application with its relevant firm and bank characteristics. 
In the main regressions we include firm fixed effects, naturally restricting the sample 
to firms that filed at least one application that did not result in a loan and one 
application that did during the sample period (with an average value equal to 43.0 
percent, see Table 1). In robustness we will analyze all loan applications and the 
dependent variable then equals one for all firm-month combinations with one or more 
granted loans and equals zero otherwise. 
2.  Independent Variables 
As independent variables we include an array of macroeconomic conditions and 
firm/bank characteristics to control for changes in the quality and the propensity 24
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during the business cycle of different type of firms to apply for loans to a potentially 
varying set of banks that request information and approve the loans. 
a)  Macroeconomic Conditions 
As macroeconomic conditions we include annual GDP growth, a short-term interest 
rate measure of the annual changes in monetary policy conditions and the inflation 
rate. According to Hypothesis 1 (H1) we expect the coefficient on GDP growth to be 
positive and the coefficient on the interest rate to be negative. GDP growth, GDP, is 
available only quarterly, while both the interest rate changes and the inflation rate are 
measured monthly. Hence, to be consistent with the other macroeconomic measures, 
we interpolate GDP growth for all intermediary months (results are unaffected if we 
do not interpolate). Thus defined, GDP growth averages 3.14 percent and varies 
between -0.85 and 3.98 percent. 
Our measure for the changes in monetary conditions, IR, is the change in the 
Spanish 3-month interbank interest rate during the last year. The average change in 
the 3-month interest rate during the sample period was 0.23 percent, ranging between 
-1.56 and 1.41 percent. The use of variations in the short-term interest rate as a 
measure that proxies the change in the stance of monetary policy is fully in line with 
the literature analyzing the credit channel at the micro level.
14 Our main results are 
unaffected if we employ the level rather than the changes in this interest rate. The use 
of a 3-month interest rate is in line with many articles in Angeloni, Kashyap and 
Mojon (2003) for example that also use European data. Using the changes in the 
                                                 
14 See Jayaratne and Morgan (2000), Kashyap and Stein (2000), Kishan and Opiela (2000), Ashcraft 
(2006) and Black, Hancock and Passmore (2009) among others. On the other hand, Bernanke and 
Blinder (1992) and Christiano et al. (1996) use vector auto regressions to identify monetary policy 
shocks. But Kashyap and Stein (2000) find very similar results using either the variation in the federal 
funds rate, the Boschen and Mills (1995) index or the Bernanke and Mihov (1998) measure. 25
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overnight interbank interest rate yields very similar results, not surprisingly as the 
correlation between the two series equals 0.95. Finally, the average inflation rate, 
CPI, during the sample period was 3.33 percent, with the minimum and maximum 
were 1.43 and 5.27 respectively. 
b)  Firm Characteristics 
The composition of the pool of borrowers may change over time and different firms 
may have different degrees of success in obtaining loans from banks. To control for 
these demand-side effects, we include a broad set of firm characteristics in most 
specifications also firm fixed effects to control for time-invariant unobservable firm 
characteristics, in robustness replaced by all-encompassing firm-month and loan fixed 
effects to control for time-variant unobservable firm characteristics. The summary 
statistics of Table 1 are based on the observations used in the regressions with firm 
fixed effects. Firm balance-sheet data is taken at the end of the previous year (t-1) and 
firm credit related information over the previous year. We employ lagged values as 
economic and monetary conditions may determine the capital and liquidity ratios 
firms and banks optimally choose. 
The key firm balance-sheet variables are the CAPITAL RATIO measuring the firm’s 
net worth and the LIQUIDITY RATIO capturing its liquidity position (to distinguish 
them clearly from their corresponding bank ratios in later exercises we add FIRM in 
their label). According to Hypothesis 2 (H2) we expect the sign of the coefficients of 
both variables to be positive. The capital ratio is defined as the ratio of own funds 
over total assets of the firm and has an average value of 22.5 percent. Given the 
skewness of its distribution we employ the natural logarithm of the ratio in all 
regressions, but assess its economic relevancy in levels. The liquidity ratio is the 
current assets over total assets of the firm. It has an average value of 41.6 percent. 26
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As other firm characteristics we include controls for firm risk: Ln(TOTAL ASSETS), 
the log of the total assets of the firm in 2008 Euros; Ln(1+AGE), the log of one plus 
the age of the firm in years; ROA, the return on assets of the firm; I(DOUBTFUL 
LOANS AT THE TIME OF THE REQUEST), a dummy variable that equals one if 
the firm had doubtful loans the month before the loan was requested, and equals zero 
otherwise; I(DOUBTFUL LOANS BEFORE THE TIME OF THE REQUEST), a 
dummy variable that equals one if the firm had doubtful loans any time previous to 
the month before the loan was requested, and equals zero otherwise; Ln(1+No. 
MONTHS WITH THE BANK), the log of one plus the number of months that the 
firm had a working relationship with the bank (i.e., has outstanding loans with the 
bank; though the firm currently does not borrow from the bank as we are analyzing 
borrowing from new banks, the firm may have previously borrowed from the bank); 
and Ln(1+NUMBER OF BANK RELATIONSHIPS), the log of the number of bank 
relationships of the firm. 
As an industry characteristic we include INDUSTRY DOUBTFUL LOANS RATIO, 
which is the doubtful loan ratio of the industry in which the firm operates to control 
for the probability of loan rejections over the business cycle in the industry of the 
firm. As a province characteristic, we include Ln(No. BANKS) which is the log of the 
number of banks in the province where the firm is located (a province in Spain 
roughly corresponds to a Metropolitan Statistical Area in the United States). Many 
firms borrow from local banks (Petersen and Rajan (2002), Degryse and Ongena 
(2005)) so this variable controls for the number of banks that a firm may approach. 
The variable also partially captures the intensity of local bank competition. 27
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c)  Bank Characteristics 
The key bank balance-sheet variables we are interested are the bank’s CAPITAL 
RATIO as a measure of the bank’s net worth and the LIQUIDITY RATIO as a 
measure of its’ liquidity position. The capital ratio is defined as the ratio of core 
capital over total assets of the bank (as in Bernanke and Lown (1991) for example). 
Core capital is defined as total equity plus retained earnings. As we use the book 
value of equity and assets are not risk adjusted, our measure is equivalent to a pure 
leverage ratio. Thus defined it has an average value of 5.4 percent. Unlike in the US 
there is no regulated minimum leverage ratio in Spain, hence its minimum is very 
low. As with firm capital we take its natural logarithm but results are similar without 
this transformation. 
The LIQUIDITY RATIO is the ratio of liquid assets held by the bank (i.e., cash and 
deposits with central banks and other credit institutions, and public debt with a 
maturity up to one year) and the total assets of the bank. Banks on average held 
almost 17 percent of their balance-sheet in liquid assets. 
Lending behavior may vary across banks, hence we control for bank variables that 
may affect bank lending and in robustness also feature bank fixed effects. We 
therefore include: Ln(TOTAL ASSETS), the log of the total assets of the bank in 
2008 euro; ROA, the return on assets of the bank; DOUBTFUL LOANS RATIO, the 
doubtful loan ratio of the bank; and the HERFINDAHL BY INDUSTRY, the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index of the bank’s credit portfolio by industry. 
3.  Results 
Our empirical exercises assessing the extensive margin of lending are structured as 
follows: we first focus on the impact of economic and monetary conditions (GDP 
and  IR) and, second, and more importantly, on the interactions between the 28
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economic and monetary conditions and the strength of the firm and bank balance 
sheets – proxied by CAPITAL RATIO and LIQUIDITY RATIO. The regressions are 
at the loan application level and we match the loan application outcomes (whether the 
loan is granted or not) with the associated macroeconomic, firm, industry, province, 
and bank information. 
We control – and exploit – the strength of the balance sheets of both the firms and the 
banks associated with each loan application. Firm fixed effects allow us to compare 
lending to the same firm under different economic and monetary conditions and for 
different bank strength. Taking an additional step towards identification we compare 
loan granting within the set of applications made by: (a) different firms in the same 
month to the same bank; (b) the same firm in the same month to different banks; and 
(c) the same firm for the same loan to different banks. In (a) the quality of the lending 
banks is held constant, whereas in (b) and (c) the quality of the potential pool of 
borrowers is held constant. 
a)  Economic and Monetary Conditions 
Table 2 reports for the baseline conditional logit model (i.e., a logit that controls for 
firm fixed effects) the estimated coefficients, between parentheses the standard errors 
that are clustered at the firm level, and the corresponding significance levels. 
We start analyzing the direct effects of economic and monetary conditions on the 
probability that the LOAN APPLICATION IS GRANTED. Following Hypothesis 1 
(H1) we expect the estimated coefficient on GDP to be positive as loan granting 
(corresponding improving firm and bank balance-sheet strength) increases with GDP 
growth. And following positive short-term interest rate changes we expect loan 
granting to decrease as agency costs of lending would increase. Hence we expect the 
coefficient on IR to be negative. 29
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In Table 2 we indeed find that GDP growth spurs loan granting while short-term 
interest rate hikes reduce loan granting. The semi-elasticity column indicates that both 
effects are also economically relevant. At the mean of all variables, a one standard 
deviation increase in GDP growth (from 3.14 to 4.07 percent), for example, increases 
the loan granting probability by almost 12 percent (from 43 to 48 percent), while a 
one standard deviation increase in the short-term interest rate variation (from 0.23 to 
1.05 percent) decreases the loan granting probability by three and a quarter percent 
(from 43 to 41 percent). 
We note that the estimated coefficients on GDP growth and the change in the interest 
rate are obtained in specifications that include a comprehensive set of firm and bank 
characteristics, and firm fixed effects. These variables absorb changes in loan demand 
quality over the business cycle, i.e., changes in the pool of applicant firms that apply 
for and obtain loans from different banks, and changes in the balance sheet strength of 
banks. We also add the number of loan applications to key specifications, its growth 
rate declines during the recession, but results are virtually unaffected (in addition, the 
month, bank-month, firm-month, or loan fixed effects added later will also absorb 
variation in the propensity to apply).
15 
In sum, controlling for firm and bank characteristics, we find that loan granting 
increases in good times, i.e., when GDP growth is higher and the cost of financing 
(short-term interest rate) is lower. Theory of the firm and bank balance-sheet channels 
predict the effects we have found so far, but also predict that these effects will work 
mainly through the strength of balance-sheet of firms and banks respectively. 
                                                 
15 During periods of adverse economic or monetary conditions the firms’ propensity to apply may 
decrease in response to tightening bank lending standards (Dell’Ariccia et al. (2008)). Weaker firms 
likely anticipate an even lower probability of loan approval during these periods. Consequently weaker 
firms may apply less, the pool of applicants may become better and therefore our estimates should be 
conservative. 30
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However we first now discuss the coefficients on the firm and bank characteristics 
once and then turn back to the focus of our study which are the effects of the changes 
in economic (and monetary) conditions through the strength of the balance sheets of 
firms (and banks) on loan granting. 
b)  Firm and Bank Characteristics 
The estimated coefficients on the firm characteristics are overall and across all 
specifications statistically significant, economically relevant, stable and in line with 
straightforward priors. These results suggest therefore that these controls are at once 
needed and relevant. Applications from firms with a higher capital ratio are more 
likely to be successful. Therefore, we find clear support for Hypothesis 2 (H2). The 
coefficient on firm liquidity is not significant, but it becomes significant in models 
where liquidity is also interacted with economic and monetary conditions (Tables 3 
and 4). This indicates liquidity matters especially for firms that lack it when growth is 
low and short-term interest rates are high. 
Loan applications from larger, older and more profitable firms, from firms with fewer 
doubtful loans at or prior to the loan application or from an industry with a lower 
doubtful loan ratio, and from firms with longer and fewer bank relationships located 
in a province with many banks are also more successful. Hence, ceteris paribus more 
transparent firms with a stronger balance-sheet and with a longer and more 
impeccable track record can rely more on external financing (as in Jensen and 
Meckling (1976)), as so can firms with stronger and bilateral relationships in 
competitive banking markets (see Freixas and Rochet (2008) and Degryse et al. 
(2009) for reviews of theory and empirical evidence). 
Regarding bank characteristics, more solvent and liquid banks are less prone to lend 
to new borrowers. Riskier banks (i.e., with higher NPL ratios and more industry 31
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concentrated loan portfolios) have a higher probability of granting loans to new 
borrowers. These results are further robust to the inclusion of firm-month or loan 
application fixed effects for example (unreported). Therefore, either using capital and 
liquidity ratios or other measures of bank strength, we find a clear negative sign when 
assessing Hypothesis 2 (H2). This result potentially hints to a type of behavior where 
lowly capitalized banks may have larger incentives to take more risk (see again the 
aforementioned reviews). 
Overall, we find these estimated coefficients in line with theory and their statistical 
significance and stability reassuring for our investigation of the different credit 
channels (as the working of these channels require the imperfect substitutability 
between external and internal financing that is especially acute for small and opaque 
firms and for small banks). 
c)  Firm and Bank Balance Sheet Channels 
Table 3 analyzes the impact of both economic and monetary conditions on loan 
granting through both firm and bank balance sheet channels. As argued before, the 
simultaneous assessment of both channels is necessary to avoid an omitted-variables 
problem. Table 3 therefore includes the interactions of both GDP growth and the 
change in the short-term interest rate with firm and bank capital and liquidity ratios 
suggested by Hypothesis 3 (H3).
16 
Model I in Table 3 contains our benchmark regression. As explained in the previous 
Sections, GDP growth and interest rate changes are not highly correlated in Spain 
because of the relatively low level of synchronization of economic activity in Spain 
                                                 
16 In unreported specifications we exclude various combinations of economic and/or monetary 
conditions and firm and/or bank capital and liquidity (and their interactions). Results are mostly 
unaffected in terms of statistical significance though not always in terms of their economic relevance. 32
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vis-à-vis the largest euro area countries, even after 1999 (Giannone et al. (2008)). This 
allows us to exploit simultaneously the variation in output and monetary conditions 
interacted with firm and bank capital and liquidity. 
The estimates in Model I suggest that the negative effect of lower GDP growth or 
positive changes in the short-term interest rate on the probability that a LOAN 
APPLICATION IS GRANTED is stronger for firms with low capital or liquidity and 
(independently) for banks with low capital or liquidity.
17 To put it differently, 
“weaker” firms or banks are more pro-cyclical (in GDP or interest rate) in terms of 
loan granting than stronger ones. For zero changes in GDP and the interest rate, the 
probability that a LOAN APPLICATION IS GRANTED is lower for firms with low 
capital or liquidity and from banks with low capital or liquidity.
18 Hence overall H3 is 
confirmed. 
In Figure 1 we further explore the economic relevance of these estimated effects. We 
plot the percentage change in the probability that a LOAN APPLICATION IS 
GRANTED for a one standard deviation increase in GDP growth (GDP) or in the 
change in the short-term interest rate (IR) for values in the 25
th to 75
th percentile 
ranges of the FIRM and BANK CAPITAL RATIO (the values of both ratios are 
                                                 
17 The ordinarily reported standard errors and marginal effects of interacted variables in non-linear 
models require corrections (Ai and Norton (2003), Norton et al. (2004)). For the benchmark model we 
calculate the corrected standard errors and marginal effects based on the above papers, and 
alternatively linearize the benchmark model and estimate it using ordinary linear squares. In both cases 
the results are very similar to the standard (i.e., non-corrected) non-linear model estimates, not 
surprising as the mean of the dependent variable is close to 0.5. Hence we report the ordinarily reported 
non-linear estimates. 
18 The coefficient on bank liquidity is not statistically significant however. If bank capital is pro-
cyclical, we may underestimate the total impact of current economic and monetary conditions on 
lending since adverse economic and tight monetary conditions, by reducing bank capital, may further 
decrease credit availability. See also Adrian and Shin (2009), Brunnermeier et al. (2009) and Shin 
(2009) for example on the importance of overnight rates for bank liquidity and behavior. In unreported 
specifications we also add interactions of firm with bank capital and firm with bank liquidity and, in 
addition, interact also those two terms with GDP growth and interest rate changes respectively. None of 
the estimated coefficients on the latter four interactive terms is statistically significant however, 
suggesting that, when economic and monetary conditions are tight, weaker banks cut lending across the 
board, including lending to strong firms. 33
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displayed in levels in the Figure). The effect of a one standard deviation increase in 
GDP growth on the probability that a LOAN APPLICATION IS GRANTED is 
always sizeable and around 12 percent, but fairly equal across the changes in firm and 
bank capital ratios, although the effect of firm capital ratio on GDP growth is slightly 
higher. When both firm and bank capital ratios are high (75
th percentile) the effect is 9 
percent, when both are low (25
th percentile) the effect is 16 percent. 
The effect of a one standard deviation increase in the change in the short-term 
interest rate, on the other hand, depends mostly on the bank capital ratio. At the 25
th 
percentile of the firm capital ratio, the effect varies between -3.5 percent for highly 
capitalized banks and -7.5 percent for lowly capitalized banks. This finding suggests 
that  in contrast to changes in GDP growth that work through both firm and bank 
balance sheet channels  monetary policy changes work predominantly through the 
banking lending channel. Findings for FIRM and BANK LIQUIDITY are similar 
(Figure 2). Both GDP growth and interest rate changes now work only through the 
bank channel, highlighting the important role played by bank liquidity and the bank 
balance sheet channel in general. 
d)  Various Effects Models 
We now present the estimates of various fixed effects models in the rest of Table 3.
19 
In Model II we add bank and month fixed effects to the firm fixed effects. Bank fixed 
                                                 
19 In an unreported specification we replace in Model I the firm by region and industry fixed effects. 
Firm fixed effects absorb unobservable firm heterogeneity that is fixed over time and that may 
determine firm capital and liquidity for example if it is not accounted for by other controls. But 
including firm effects removes all firms with loan applications that were always or never granted 
within the sample period from the sample. By dropping the firm effects these firms re-enter the sample 
and the number of loan applications in this sample increases to 816,852. The estimated coefficients on 
firm size, age and number of bank relationships reverse sign (from Model I) demonstrating the 
importance of controlling for time-invariant unobserved firm heterogeneity (see also Model III). 
However, the estimated coefficients on the interactions remain very similar, except for the coefficient 
on the interaction term between the interest rate changes and firm capital which is no longer 
statistically significant (but it was already small economically speaking in Model I). 34
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effects capture the still-unaccounted-for bank heterogeneity that is fixed over time. 
Month fixed effects capture the changes in economy-wide conditions, such as current 
and future expectations of GDP growth, inflation and interest rates and general shocks 
affecting the economy. Hence, all variables at the country level are dropped from the 
empirical model and the identification entirely comes from the interactions. The 
estimated coefficients are similar to those in Model I, except for the coefficient on the 
interaction between the interest rate changes and firm liquidity which is no longer 
statistically significant (this interaction was economically not very relevant in Model 
I) and the coefficient on the interaction between the interest rate changes and bank 
capital which reduces in absolute size. The latter finding is not surprising as the 
largest part of variation of bank capital is between but not within banks. 
Model III drops firm fixed effects and saturates the model with bank-month fixed 
effects, i.e., and instead of adding up bank and month fixed effects we multiply them. 
We replace the firm by region and industry effects to make estimation possible. The 
firms with loan applications that were always or never granted therefore re-enter the 
sample and the number of loan applications increases to 813,115. We find that, within 
all the loan applications received by a bank in a month, firms with low capital or 
liquidity are less likely to be granted a loan when GDP growth is lower. 
In Model IV we include firm-month fixed effects (but no other effects). A firm-
month fixed effects model accounts for the impact on loan granting of all observed 
time-varying firm characteristics (e.g., firm size and credit rating) and unobserved 
time-varying firm characteristics such as firm risk, quality, investment opportunities, 
the strength of the firm’s bank relationships, and access to market finance (Petersen 
and Rajan (1994), among others). Hence all the independent firm characteristics and 
macro variables and their interactions have to be dropped from the model. In addition, 35
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to be included in the regression a firm must have filed more than one loan application 
in the same month, reducing in turn the number of observations to 155,167. All 
estimated coefficients are similar to Model I. In addition, in Model V we present 
estimates from a loan fixed effects model, where the 134,445 loan applications are 
included that resulted in a granted loan and for which multiple applications were filed. 
Again, results are very similar to both Models I and IV. 
In sum, Models IV and V show that within the set of applications made in the same 
month by the same firm to different banks and resulting in at least one granted loan, 
and within the set of different applications made for the same granted loan, banks with 
low capital or liquidity grant fewer loans when GDP growth is lower or short-term 
interest rate increases are larger.
20 Assuming that the very small changes in firm 
quality that occur during each month are not correlated with the quality of the 
approached banks − which is the case for example if firm quality is constant within 
each month − our results imply that under tight conditions (i.e., a recession or tight 
monetary policy) a lower capital level has an impact on credit supply. This is a key 
result since Bernanke and Lown (1991) define credit crunch as “a significant leftward 
shift in the supply curve for loans, holding constant both the safe real interest rate 
and the quality of potential borrowers” (our italicizing). As far as we are aware we 
are the first to identify and document in such a clear-cut way (i.e., it is the same firm 
that do apply at the same time or for the same loan to several banks) the occurrence of 
this phenomenon. 
                                                 
20 The coefficient on the interaction between GDP growth and bank liquidity is no longer statistically 
significant at standard levels. 36
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e)  Loan Applications from Current Borrowers 
Our estimations so far focused on the probability that loan applications from 
noncurrent borrowers get approved (i.e., the extensive margin). However, firms may 
initially apply to banks they currently don’t borrow from, but if their applications fail 
return to their current lenders to obtain new loans there. These “applications of last 
resort” with current lenders will not trigger information requests because lenders 
automatically obtain monthly information from the CIR on all their current borrowers. 
Not including such applications may bias our findings. To address this potential 
problem, Model VI studies lending to all borrowers without any outstanding bank 
debt (hence borrowers without any current lender) and Table 4 analyzes all lending to 
all borrowers that applied for a loan, key to assess potential credit substitution by 
firms that get rejected by some banks. 
The estimation in Model VI is based on 33,345 firms that have no bank debt 
outstanding at t-1. The number of firm-month observations equals only 42,029, 
suggesting that most firms are without bank debt for only one month (these are 
therefore most likely new firms). Firm fixed effects are therefore impossible, so we 
include region and industry fixed effects. The coefficients on the interaction terms 
confirm the existence of a bank balance sheet channel. 
f)  Credit Substitution: Loan Applications and All Granted Loans 
Matching the loan application dataset to all granted loans in Spain, Table 4 presents 
estimates of conditional logit models of whether a firm gets (a) loan(s), conditioning 
on the firm having applied for (a) loan(s) reflecting its need for financing. The 
dependent variable is now AT LEAST ONE LOAN APPLICATION IS GRANTED 
which equals one if firm i applies for at least a loan at time t and one or more loans 37
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are granted from any bank in month t to t+3, and equals zero if firm i applies for at 
least a loan at time t but did not obtain any loans from any bank in t to t+3. 
This new dependent variable defined as granted loans per applying firm and month in 
effect “expands” the previous dependent variable LOAN APPLICATION IS 
GRANTED that was confined to loan applications per  firm – month – bank. 
Moreover, the granted loans to the firm can now come from either their non-current 
banks, which request information from the CIR when the firm applies, or from their 
current banks, which do not request any. The mean for this new dependent variable is 
higher than for the variable employed in Table 1 (61% versus 43%), because some 
firms that did not obtain loans from the non-current banks can obtain them from their 
current banks. 
The independent variables in Table 4 are the same as those in Table 3, with one 
exception: bank characteristics are now those of the average bank the firm either 
borrows from or gets rejected by (including the current banks). Table 4 displays three 
representative models: one without interactions, one with interactions, and one with 
interactions and month fixed effects (we also include firm fixed effects in all models). 
Overall, and despite the use of the average bank characteristics, results are quite 
similar to those in Tables 2 and 3. Conditioning on their need for financing, firms 
with low capital or liquidity that try to borrow from non-current banks or are 
associated with current banks with low capital or liquidity ratios have a lower 
probability of obtaining loans during tighter economic or monetary times. Hence, 
even average firms associated to weak banks have a higher probability of not 
obtaining a single granted loan despite their need for funds. Hence, the results suggest 
that loan supply restrictions are binding and cannot be fully offset by firms turning to 
other banks. 38
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B. The Intensive Margin with All Granted Loans 
The set of loan applications we have used so far are loan applications during the 
period 2002:M02 – 2008:M12 to banks from firms that try to borrow from them and 
which are currently not customers (i.e., the extensive margin of lending). We now 
extend the analysis to the set of all granted loans for the period 1988:Q2 to 2008:Q4 
(during which there were two economic recessions) and study the intensive margin of 
lending to account for changes in loan amounts and maturities. We match the granted 
loans with bank balance sheets and income statements culled from the monthly bank 
reports collected by the Banco de España.
 21 
This extended sample offers a worse environment for disentangling loan supply from 
demand. Firms may not have new loans in a quarter either because they did not 
borrow, or because they tried to borrow but their loan applications were all rejected, 
or because the loan conditions offered by the banks were not attractive enough. 
Consequently there is a problem identifying loan supply from demand and a positive 
(negative) coefficient of GDP (interest rates) on granted loans may be due to a higher 
loan demand or a higher loan supply, or both. 
However, we identify loan supply through a difference-in-difference exercise. Since 
the firm channel and loan demand is a firm-level shock, we do the analysis at the loan 
level, using all granted loans, controlling for unobserved time-varying firm loan 
demand and quality shocks by including firm-quarter fixed effects as in Khwaja and 
                                                 
21 Starting in 1992 we can match loan contracts with complete firm characteristics. Non-reported 
regressions that include all firm variables that were also employed in the loan application exercises 
corroborate the relevance of both firm and bank balance sheet channels for loan granting. Because 
Spanish monetary policy basically became decided in Frankfurt in 1988 (see Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró 
and Saurina (2008)) and because an important economic recession started in Spain in 1992, we only 
present the estimates from the longer 1988-2008 time-period. As firm-quarter fixed effects will absorb 
the impact of firm balance-sheet and loan demand channels, we can still identify loan supply (the bank 
lending channel) and, in addition, we can test whether the firm channel is correlated or not with the 
bank lending channel (i.e., whether an analysis done at the bank level under- or overestimates the 
potency of the bank lending channel). 39
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Mian (2008). In this way identification is possible by comparing changes in credit for 
the  same firm in the same quarter by banks with different levels of capital and 
liquidity ratios over the business cycle. If for example a firm that borrows from at 
least two banks starts obtaining less credit from the weaker vis-à-vis the stronger 
bank(s) when monetary and economic conditions are tighter, then such a result would 
suggest that it is the bank lending channel and not the firm loan demand or quality 
(channel) that is causing the changes in credit. Since we have access to all granted 
loans, we can perform this exercise. 
Not only do we want to test the existence of the bank lending channel, but also 
whether the bank-lending channel is correlated with firm demand and balance-sheet 
channels. We can do this by comparing the results on the bank lending channel 
between the models with and without firm-quarter fixed effects. This is a key test to 
shed light on whether the credit channel should be tested at the firm or bank level or if 
one needs to test for the presence of the bank lending channel employing loan level 
data. 
Table 5 presents the summary statistics of the dependent and independent variables 
employed in the sample of granted loans (representing 20% of all loans and randomly 
drawn on the basis of tax identification numbers to steer clear of computational 
constraints). The dependent variable ΔLN(LOAN CREDIT) is the change in 
outstanding credit of firm i granted by bank b during quarter t. Its average value 
equals -0.01, with a standard deviation equal to 0.48. As independent variables in the 
models we include as much as possible the same macroeconomic conditions and bank 
characteristics we employed when analyzing loan applications. GDP has an average 
value of 3.28 percent, the average IR is -0.36 percent, and the average CPI is 3.64 40
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percent. The average BANK CAPITAL RATIO is 6.10 percent and the average 
BANK LIQUIDITY RATIO is 25.93 percent. 
Table 6 presents the estimated models. Given our focus on the interaction between 
business cycle and bank balance-sheet strength variables, we cluster the errors in 
bank-time. We present four models: Model I does not feature any fixed effect, while 
Models II, III and IV include quarter,  firm, and firm-quarter fixed effects, 
respectively. Model IV fully accounts for unobserved time-varying firm loan demand 
and quality shocks, i.e., the firm loan demand and balance sheet channels.
22 
The first column shows results similar to those on the extensive margin in Table 2. 
Higher GDP growth or lower short term interest rates imply more granted loans. 
These results could still be due to both higher loan demand and/or higher loan supply. 
In addition, we find that the effects of economic and monetary conditions are stronger 
for banks with lower capital and liquidity ratios, similar to the results we reported in 
Table 3. In Model II we control for firm fixed effects to account for time-invariant 
firm loan demand and quality shocks. We find statistically similar but economically 
stronger results as compared to Model I. Hence controlling for loan demand 
strengthens the bank lending channel. However, as explained above, loan demand 
volume and firm net worth may react to the business cycle. 
In Model III we introduce time fixed effects to focus on the micro interactions. We 
find that bank capital still channels output and monetary changes. But, more 
importantly, when we control for firm-quarter fixed effects in Model IV (and hence 
account for all time-varying firm loan demand and quality shocks) the estimated 
                                                 
22 Regressions that include firm-quarter fixed effects require that firms that at least once in their history 
borrow from two different banks during the same quarter. Given our focus on Model 4, we employ this 
set of firms in Models I to III as well. However, the bank lending channel similarly exists if we study 
the universe of all loans with these three specifications (to conserve space we choose not to report these 
results). 41
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coefficients on bank capital significantly increase in absolute size. Hence, not only do 
we identify the existence of a bank channel but its economic significance increases 
when we control for firm loan demand and balance-sheet channels. 
In sum, we find evidence for the existence of a strong bank lending channel. The 
bank-lending channel strengthens if we control for firm-quarter fixed effects that 
account for unobserved time-varying firm loan demand and quality. This last result 
implies that empirical analysis of the bank lending channel done at the bank level 
(following the seminal paper by Kashyap and Stein (2000)) may significantly 
underestimate the strength of the bank lending channel. This may explain why in 
contrast to most of the literature we find evidence for the existence of a strong bank-
lending channel. 
V.  Conclusions and Policy Implications 
Do business cycle fluctuations and the stance of monetary policy affect credit 
supply? And, if so, how relevant are the firm versus the bank balance-sheet channels 
both for the business cycle and for monetary policy? These questions are not only key 
for macroeconomics in general but also for handling of the current crisis in particular. 
However, to answer these questions there are three main identification challenges: (1) 
An economic downturn and/or high cost of short-term financing may reduce both loan 
supply and demand. (2) Separating firm from bank balance-sheet channels creates an 
identification challenge since firms with low balance-sheet strength that are more 
bank dependent may borrow more from banks with low balance-sheet strength. (3) 
Separating the effects of economic activity and monetary conditions is also 
problematic as short-term interest rate changes may be completely determined by the 
business cycle. 42
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Our contribution to the literature lies in meeting these three identification challenges. 
We use a uniquely and comprehensive micro-dataset on loans that contains: (1) for 
the last seven years all monthly information requests by banks following loan 
applications from firms that are currently not borrowing from them; and (2) for the 
last twenty years, information on all granted loans to non-financial firms by all credit 
institutions. This dataset helps us to separate loan supply from demand, and firm from 
bank balance-sheet channels. The dataset is from Spain, a bank-dominated country 
with pronounced business cycles and a fairly exogenous monetary policy. 
We analyze the extensive margin of lending with loan applications and find the 
following results: (1) lower GDP growth or positive short-term interest rate changes 
reduce loan granting. (2) A decrease in firm capital reduces loan granting, but a 
decrease in bank capital or liquidity increases loan granting. (3) The negative effect of 
lower GDP growth or higher short-term interest rates on credit availability is stronger 
for both firms with low capital or liquidity and (independently) from banks with low 
capital or liquidity. Both the business cycle and monetary policy effects work strongly 
through the bank lending channel, while the level of firm capital plays a substantial 
role in channeling changes in GDP growth to changes in loan granting. 
Moreover, within the set of different applications for a loan from the same firm in the 
same month to different banks (i.e., keeping constant the quality of potential 
borrowers), we find that banks with low capital or liquidity grant fewer loans when 
GDP growth is lower or short-term interest rates are higher.  
To analyze possible credit substitution by firms we match the loan level application 
data with all granted loans. We find that weak firms in need of funds, and also 
average firms associated with banks with weaker capital or liquidity, have a lower 
probability of obtaining a loan when economic and monetary conditions are tighter. 43
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Loan supply restrictions, our results therefore suggest, are binding and cannot be fully 
offset by firms turning to other banks. 
Finally, we analyze the intensive margin of lending by using all business loans that 
were granted in Spain during the last 20 years. To account for both observed and 
unobserved time-varying firm loan demand and quality shocks we saturate the 
specification with firm-quarter fixed effects. Not only do we find a significant bank 
lending channel, but we also find that the bank-lending channel is stronger if firm-
quarter fixed effects are included. Our results therefore suggest that any empirical 
analysis of the bank lending channel done at the bank level may significantly 
underestimate the strength of the bank lending channel. 
In sum, our results suggest that the levels of firm and bank balance-sheet strength 
play an economically relevant role when channeling changes in GDP and short-term 
interest rates to credit availability, and that one may underestimate the potency of the 
bank lending channel when analyzing it at the bank level because firm loan demand 
and quality are correlated with the bank balance-sheet strength. 
Improved identification makes the interpretation of the reduced-form coefficients 
more reliable. Our policy conclusions further have an immediate bearing on the 
current financial and economic crisis. First, the contracting effects of a slowdown in 
economic activity or a tightening of monetary policy on the supply of bank loans may 
be amplified by low firm and bank capital. Second, for the easing monetary policy to 
increase credit availability, especially bank capital matters. Frictions between banks 
and their financiers may have further gained in prominence as banks increasingly 
turned from core deposit to wholesale funding. In a low credit supply environment 
and with weakly capitalized banks it is therefore more difficult and risky than ever for 
monetary policy to “exit” from a low level of the short-term interest rate as loan 44
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supply reductions may be severe. Finally, firm and bank recapitalizations and 
liquidity injections will in principle increase the supply of bank loans. But the way in 
which this balance sheet strengthening is executed (e.g., central bank lending to 
banks) may affect the credit expansion. We leave this conjecture for future research. 45
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FIGURE 1. FIRM AND BANK CAPITAL RATIO AND THE EXTENSIVE MARGIN OF LENDING 
The figure plots the percentage change in the probability that a LOAN APPLICATION IS 
GRANTED for a one standard deviation increase in GDP growth (GDP) or a one standard 
deviation increase in the change in the short-term interest rate (IR) for values in the 25
th to 
75
th percentile range of firm and bank CAPITAL RATIO, based on the estimates in Table 3 
Model I. All variables are otherwise set equal to their mean. The sample period equals 
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FIGURE 2. FIRM AND BANK LIQUIDITY RATIO AND THE EXTENSIVE MARGIN OF LENDING  
The figure plots the percentage change in the probability that a LOAN APPLICATION IS 
GRANTED for a one standard deviation increase in GDP growth (GDP) or a one standard 
deviation increase in the change in the short-term interest rate (IR) for values in the 25
th to 
75
th percentile range of firm and bank LIQUIDITY RATIO, based on the estimates in Table 
3 Model I. All variables are otherwise set equal to their mean. The sample period equals 
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TABLE 2. CONDITIONS AND THE EXTENSIVE MARGIN OF LENDING 
The estimates this table lists are based on a conditional logit model. The dependent variable is 
LOAN APPLICATION IS GRANTEDibt which equals one if the loan application in month t 
by firm i is approved by bank b and the loan is granted, and equals zero otherwise. The 
definition of the other variables can be found in Table 1. Subscripts indicate the time of 
measurement of each variable. The sample period equals 2002:M2 – 2008:M12. The 
coefficients are listed in the first column and standard errors clustered at the firm level are 
between parentheses in the second column. Significance levels are in the third column. *** 
Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. The semi-elasticity column 







ΔGDPt 22.465 0.622 *** 11.91
ΔIRt ‐6.978 0.742 *** ‐3.25
ΔCPIt ‐0.064 0.440 ‐0.03
Firm characteristics (i)
Ln(FIRM CAPITAL RATIOit‐1) 0.256 0.038 *** 2.64
FIRM LIQUIDITY RATIOit‐1 ‐0.024 0.029 ‐0.14
Ln(TOTAL ASSETSit‐1) 0.023 0.011 ** 7.14
Ln(1+AGEit‐1) 0.078 0.022 *** 3.95
ROAit‐1 0.315 0.056 *** 1.59
I(DOUBTFUL LOANS AT THE TIME OF THE REQUESTit‐1) ‐0.452 0.051 *** ‐25.73
I(DOUBTFUL LOANS BEFORE THE TIME OF THE REQUESTit‐1) ‐0.173 0.039 *** ‐9.86
LN(1+No. MONTHS WITH THE BANKibt‐1) 0.029 0.003 *** 4.86
Ln(1+NUMBER OF BANK RELATIONSHIPSibt‐1) ‐0.747 0.016 *** ‐36.37
Industry characteristics (s)
INDUSTRY DOUBTFUL LOANS RATIOst‐1 ‐5.495 1.047 *** ‐1.88
Province characteristics (p)
LN(No. BANKSpt‐1) 0.511 0.069 *** 8.07
Characteristics of the bank (b)
Ln(BANK CAPITAL RATIObt‐1) ‐0.474 0.036 *** ‐2.29
BANK LIQUIDITY RATIObt‐1 ‐0.296 0.047 *** ‐1.36
LN(TOTAL ASSETSbt‐1) 0.011 0.003 *** 0.70
ROAbt‐1 0.699 0.594 0.22
DOUBTFUL LOANS RATIObt‐1 1.364 0.500 *** 0.66




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































56TABLE 4. CONDITIONS, CAPITAL AND LIQUIDITY, AND CREDIT SUBSTITUTION  
The estimates this table lists are based on conditional logit models. The dependent variable is 
AT LEAST ONE LOAN APPLICATION IS GRANTEDit which equals one if firm i applies 
for a loan at time t and one or more loans are granted in month t to t+3 by any bank, and 
equals zero if firm i applies for a loan at time t but did not obtain any loans in t to t+3. The 
definition of the other variables can be found in Table 1. The bank characteristics are those of 
the average bank the firm either borrows from or gets rejected by. Subscripts indicate the 
time of measurement of each variable. The sample period equals 2002:M2 – 2008:M12. For 
each model coefficients are listed in the first column and standard errors clustered at the firm 
level are between parentheses in the second column. Significance levels are in the third 
column. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
 
I II III
Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E.
Macroeconomic conditions (t)
ΔGDPt 20.985 1.061 *** 56.097 8.412 ***
ΔGDPt*Ln(FIRM CAPITAL RATIOit‐1) ‐13.026 3.017 *** ‐17.099 3.052 ***
ΔGDPt*Ln(BANK CAPITAL RATIObt‐1) ‐47.646 20.776 ** ‐41.239 20.603 **
ΔGDPt*FIRM LIQUIDITY RATIOit‐1 ‐9.114 2.451 *** ‐8.263 2.457 ***
ΔGDPt*BANK LIQUIDITY RATIObt‐1 ‐39.351 16.469 ** 0.118 17.440
ΔIRt ‐12.851 1.332 *** ‐26.550 7.570 ***
ΔIRt*Ln(FIRM CAPITAL RATIOit‐1) ‐1.074 3.609 5.701 3.666
ΔIRt*Ln(BANK CAPITAL RATIObt‐1) 5.630 16.943 10.857 17.114
ΔIRt*FIRM LIQUIDITY RATIOit‐1 8.511 2.974 *** 7.017 2.982 **
ΔIRt*BANK LIQUIDITY RATIObt‐1 52.196 14.949 *** 40.614 16.878 **
ΔCPIt ‐1.146 0.689 * ‐0.768 0.694
Firm characteristics (i)
Ln(FIRM CAPITAL RATIOit‐1) 0.173 0.058 *** 0.588 0.112 *** 0.754 0.114 ***
FIRM LIQUIDITY RATIOit‐1 0.038 0.042 0.315 0.087 *** 0.297 0.087 ***
Ln(TOTAL ASSETSit‐1) 0.131 0.017 *** 0.132 0.017 *** 0.144 0.017 ***
Ln(1+AGEit‐1) 0.011 0.034 0.016 0.035 0.200 0.039 ***
ROAit‐1 0.241 0.075 *** 0.244 0.075 *** 0.198 0.075 ***
I(DOUBTFUL LOANS AT THE TIME OF THE REQUESTit‐1) ‐0.906 0.080 *** ‐0.892 0.080 *** ‐0.889 0.080 ***
I(DOUBTFUL LOANS BEFORE THE TIME OF THE REQUESTit‐1) ‐0.486 0.065 *** ‐0.472 0.065 *** ‐0.456 0.065 ***
Ln(1+No. MONTHS WITH THE BANKibt‐1) 0.071 0.009 *** 0.071 0.009 *** 0.070 0.009 ***
Ln(1+NUMBER OF BANK RELATIONSHIPSibt‐1) ‐0.025 0.023 ‐0.022 0.023 ‐0.013 0.023
Industry characteristics (s)
INDUSTRY DOUBTFUL LOANS RATIOst‐1 ‐9.138 3.364 *** ‐8.201 3.382 ** ‐10.717 3.478 ***
Province characteristics (p)
Ln(No. BANKSpt‐1) 0.453 0.111 *** 0.456 0.111 *** 0.290 0.114 **
Characteristics of the mean lending or rejecting bank (b)
ln(BANK CAPITAL RATIObt‐1) 0.498 0.160 *** 2.005 0.707 *** 1.601 0.701 **
BANK LIQUIDITY RATIObt‐1 ‐0.092 0.150 1.204 0.552 ** ‐0.386 0.590
Ln(TOTAL ASSETSbt‐1) 0.022 0.009 ** 0.023 0.009 *** 0.045 0.009 ***
ROAbt‐1 0.117 1.842 0.212 1.869 4.437 1.984 **
DOUBTFUL LOANS RATIObt‐1 1.366 1.374 2.131 1.412 1.263 1.479
HERFINDAHL BY INDUSTRYbt‐1 ‐0.313 0.164 * ‐0.255 0.166 0.450 0.180 **
Firm Fixed Effects yes yes yes
Month Fixed Effects no no yes
No. Observations 240,107 240,107 240,107
No. of Clusters and Level of Clustering 56,387 Firm 56,387 Firm 56,387 Firm
Sample Period 2002:M2‐2008:M12 2002:M2‐2008:M12 2002:M2‐2008:M12
Log pseudolikelihood ‐ 88,200 ‐88,157 ‐87,948
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